In the US, the military and intelligence communities have a long-standing history of supporting transformative technological advancements such as nuclear weapons, aerospace technology, cyber technology and the Internet, and biotechnology. Despite this, there still might be cases where the expected benefits of pursuing AI development alone outweigh (in the perception of the actor) the potential harms that might arise. [25] In a particularly telling quote, Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark, and Frank Wilczek foreshadow this stark risk: One can imagine such technology outsmarting financial markets, out-inventing human researchers, out-manipulating human leaders, and developing weapons we cannot even understand. The 18th century political philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously described a dilemma that arises when a group of hunters sets out in search of a stag: To catch the prized male deer, they must cooperate, waiting quietly in the woods for its arrival. In order for human security to challenge global inequalities, there has to be cooperation between a country's foreign policy and its approach to global health. . [35] Outlining what this Coordination Regime might look like could be the topic of future research, although potential desiderata could include legitimacy, neutrality, accountability, and technical capacity; see Allan Dafoe, Cooperation, Legitimacy, and Governance in AI Development, Working Paper (2016). They will be tempted to use the prospect of negotiations with the Taliban and the upcoming election season to score quick points at their rivals expense, foregoing the kinds of political cooperation that have held the country together until now. Therefore, if it is likely that both actors perceive to be in a state of Prisoners Dilemma when deciding whether to agree on AI, strategic resources should be especially allocated to addressing this vulnerability. International Relations of Asia & US Foreign Policy. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Prisoners Dilemma game. A sudden drop in current troop levels will likely trigger a series of responses that undermine the very peace and stability the United States hopes to achieve. The Stag Hunt The Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. Because of the instantaneous nature of this particular game, we can anticipate its occurrence to be rare in the context of technology development, where opportunities to coordinate are continuous. Using Game Theory to Claim Advantage in Negotiations - Kogan Page The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. Example of stag hunt in international relations - United States guide hVN0ii ipv@B\Z7 'Q{6A"@](v`Q(TJ}Px^AYbA`Z&gh'{HoF4 JQb&b`#B$03an8"3V0yFZbwonu#xZ? As stated, which model (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) you think accurately depicts the AI Coordination Problem (and which resulting policies should be pursued) depends on the structure of payoffs to cooperating or defecting. In this model, each actors incentives are not fully aligned to support mutual cooperation and thus should present worry for individuals hoping to reduce the possibility of developing a harmful AI. (PDF) THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS I-II - ResearchGate Structural Conflict Prevention refers to a compromosde of long term intervention that aim to transform key socioeconomic, political and institional factors that could lead to conflict. Each player must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. Since the payoff of hunting the stags is higher, these interactions lead to an environment in which the Stag Hunters prosper. Additionally, this model accounts for an AI Coordination Regime that might result in variable distribution of benefits for each actor. Additionally, the defector can expect to receive the additional expected benefit of defecting and covertly pursuing AI development outside of the Coordination Regime. The Stag-hunt is probably more useful since games in life have many equilibria, and its a question of how you can get to the good ones. By failing to agree to a Coordination Regime at all [D,D], we can expect the chance of developing a harmful AI to be highest as both actors are sparing in applying safety precautions to development. The question becomes, why dont they always cheat? No payoffs (that satisfy the above conditions including risk dominance) can generate a mixed strategy equilibrium where Stag is played with a probability higher than one half. Each model is differentiated primarily by the payoffs to cooperating or defecting for each international actor. Orcas cooperatively corral large schools of fish to the surface and stun them by hitting them with their tails. 1 The metaphors that populate game theory modelsimages such as prisoners . For example, Jervis highlights the distinguishability of offensive-defensive postures as a factor in stability. In addition to boasting the worlds largest economies, China and the U.S. also lead the world in A.I. trailer Deadlock is a common if little studied occurrence in international relations, although knowledge about how deadlocks are solved can be of practical and theoretical importance. Furthermore, a unilateral strategy could be employed under a Prisoners Dilemma in order to effect cooperation. [49] For example, by defecting from an arms-reduction treaty to develop more weapons, an actor can gain the upper hand on an opponent who decides to uphold the treaty by covertly continuing or increasing arms production.
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